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The Diverse Ecology of Electronic Materials 
 
Cyrus C. M. Mody* 
 
 
Abstract 
Silicon has been the dominant material in microelectronics for a half century. Other mate-
rials, however, have subsidiary roles in microelectronics manufacturing. A few materials 
have even been promoted as replacements for silicon. Yet because of silicon’s dominance, 
none of these alternatives has gone from bench to brand; nor could any of them progress 
from brand to bench. For these reasons, historians have paid little attention to silicon and 
almost none to other microelectronics materials. I show, however, that we can better under-
stand how the organization of the semiconductor (silicon) industry has changed over time by 
examining alternative microelectronic materials. I do so by presenting two case studies: one 
of a superconducting computing program at IBM, the most likely candidate to overthrow 
silicon in the ‘70s; the other of carbon fullerenes, the most likely candidates to overthrow 
silicon today. 
 
Keywords: Nanotubes, graphene, Josephson computing, Richard Smalley, IBM, Rolf 
Landauer, academic entrepreneurship, corporate research, historical alternatives. 
 
Résumé  
Le silicium a été le matériau dominant en microélectronique durant un demi-siècle. Cepen-
dant, d’autres matériaux ont des rôles complémentaires dans cette filière. Quelques maté-
riaux ont même été promus en remplacement du silicium. Pourtant, en raison de la domi-
nation du silicium, aucune de ces alternatives n’est allée de la paillasse à la marque 
commerciale, et aucune d’entre elles ne pourrait retourner de la marque vers la paillasse. 
Pour ces raisons, les historiens ont prêté peu d’attention au silicium et presque aucun à 
d’autres matériaux de la microélectronique. Je montre, cependant, que nous pouvons mieux 
comprendre comment l’organisation de l’industrie des semi-conducteurs (silicium) a changé 
au fil du temps en examinant les matériaux microélectroniques alternatifs. Je le fais en 
présentant deux études de cas : l’un basé sur un programme d’informatique supraconduc-
trice chez IBM, le candidat le plus plausible pour renverser le silicium dans les années 70 ; 
l’autre portant sur les fullerènes (carbone), les candidats les plus plausibles pour renverser 
le silicium aujourd’hui. 
 
Mots-clés : Nanotubes, graphène, informatique Josephson, Richard Smalley, IBM, Rolf 
Landauer, entrepreneuriat universitaire, recherche industrielle, alternatives historiques. 
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218 CYRUS C. M. MODY 
 
 
HE DIGITAL electronic computer has been around for about seven-
ty years. For most of that time, the majority of computer architec-
tures have been built around transistors and other components 
embedded in integrated circuits composed primarily of silicon and silicon 
dioxide. Although there is some public awareness of the materials used in 
microelectronics (e.g. Gorilla Glass used in iPhones), professional histo-
rians have largely neglected the materials of computing. Instead, they usual-
ly profile individual mathematicians and theoretical physicists (Turing, von 
Neumann, Shockley, Bardeen) and/or big businesses (Bell Labs, IBM, Fair-
child, Intel), neither of which are described as getting their hands dirty mes-
sing with chemicals and chemical apparatus. The biggest exceptions, by far, 
have been Christophe Lécuyer and David Brock (2006), who have consis-
tently reminded us that the transistor would have been a footnote but for 
the expertise of chemists, metallurgists, and materials scientists who grew 
and purified crystals, developed novel photoresists, applied sophisticated 
acids and “dry etches”, invented techniques for cutting and polishing wa-
fers, etc. Brock and Lécuyer have hammered on the point that materials 
innovation has been indispensable both in the creation of new types of gad-
gets and in the manufacturing of vast numbers of those gadgets. 
The microelectronics industry both relies on materials innovation 
and also markets products that are used in materials innovation. Digital 
computing has been an important tool of chemical and materials research 
since at least the 1950s: in modeling of molecules (Francoeur, 2002), in 
more efficient circulation and searching of chemical abstracts (Rayward & 
Bowden, 2002), in creating a new field of computational chemistry (John-
son, 2006), in operating certain kinds of experimental apparatus (Novem-
ber, 2012). Thus, microelectronics offers a particularly clear example of the 
continuous circulation of people, materials, and ideas both from brand to 
bench and from bench to brand. 
At first glance, though, that circulation might seem rather narrowly 
confined to a single material: silicon. Silicon integrated circuit transistors 
dominate the imaginary of microelectronics – even though little semicon-
ductor manufacturing is done there any more, it is still Silicon Valley, not 
Gallium Arsenide Valley. And that is because silicon also dominates other 
material configurations of microelectronics in the marketplace. No other 
material has moved all the way from bench to brand in numbers of pro-
ducts that in any way rival silicon’s numbers. And because materials other 
than silicon hardly exist in “brand” form, they can’t move from brand to 
bench either. I will argue, however, that despite silicon’s dominance, the 
T 
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material basis of modern microelectronics is actually quite diverse, and the-
refore that the flows of people and materials into and out of the microelec-
tronics industry are quite complex. For all its dominance, silicon is hardly 
alone. More than half of the elements in the periodic table can be found in 
today’s cell phones. In addition, if we look beyond just microelectronics 
products, and expand our perspective to include manufacturing processes, we 
can see that the production of silicon integrated circuits requires an even 
more diverse array of materials which draws on a dizzying array of expertise 
from plasma physics to organic chemistry. 
Moreover, silicon integrated circuits have never gone unchallenged – 
there have always been other materials that have vied to replace silicon. Or, 
to put it less anthropomorphically, there have always been experts in silicon 
who have been dissatisfied with its performance and therefore sought out 
alternative materials. There have also always been experts in materials other 
than silicon who have sought to bring their materials into the mainstream 
of microelectronics. This article presents two case studies, one for each of 
these possibilities. The first looks at IBM’s exploration of computer archi-
tectures based on superconducting, rather than semiconducting materials; 
this effort was widely considered the best possibility for the overthrow of 
silicon in the 1970s. The second case looks at attempts, particularly by the 
Nobel laureate chemist Richard Smalley, to make carbon the central ele-
ment of microelectronics – either in the form of pure allotropes or as the 
main constituent of so-called “molecular electronics”. Molecular electronics 
and pure-carbon graphene are today widely touted as the best candidates 
for overthrowing silicon. 
Thus, while the microelectronics industry is imagined (by the public, 
by insiders, by historians) to be a semiconductor industry (and specifically a 
silicon industry), the reality is that alternatives to and hybrids with silicon 
have played an important role in silicon’s success. I therefore draw on the 
“historical alternatives” approach from business history, which pays close 
attention to the presence of alternatives and hybrids in the organization of 
manufacturing. In particular, the historical alternatives approach empha-
sizes the role of actors and organizations within an industry in proposing, 
observing, evaluating, and choosing among a variety of strategies. Although 
rarely applied to choices among technologies – much less materials – I 
argue that the historical alternatives approach can help us understand how 
the different parts of the research system generate and evaluate alternative 
materialities. By comparing my two case studies – one from the 1970s, one 
from the 1990s – I also show that we can observe how the roles of diffe-
rent constituents of the research system (corporate laboratories, universi-
ties, etc.) have evolved over the past half-century. Alternative materials 
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serve as a kind of probe to measure how different research institutions have 
changed in the past half-century. 
 
 
Alternatives and Hybrids versus Epochal Breaks 
By focusing on the materials of microelectronics, I will transgress, 
though not entirely overturn, the conventional historical narrative of the 
development of digital computers and of the semiconductor industry. That 
standard narrative depicts innovation in electronic information-processing 
as having progressed through a series of discrete material-technological 
stages going back more than a century: the electromechanical switch yielded 
to the thermionic valve/vacuum tube, which then gave way to the discrete 
germanium (and later silicon) transistor, which was superseded by the bipo-
lar (later CMOS) silicon integrated circuit, which in turn will someday sur-
render to a nanoelectronic architecture based on some other material: gra-
phene, carbon nanotubes, DNA, charge transfer salts, or perhaps an as-yet-
undiscovered molecule (Choi & Mody, 2009). 
This kind of narrative has a compelling simplicity, yet we should be 
wary of such all-one-way-or-the-other stories. Among business historians, 
Jonathan Zeitlin has been particularly critical of narratives in which forms 
of business organization switch suddenly and completely from one mode to 
another: from the family firm to the multi-division corporation to the net-
worked venture-labor enterprise. Instead, Zeitlin and Charles Sabel have 
proposed the “historical alternatives approach” to thicken the temporal 
boundaries between such transitions and to acknowledge actors’ uncertain 
and heterogeneous strategies in attempting to choose among different co-
existing organizational forms. As Zeitlin (2007, p. 124-128) puts it in a re-
view of his and Sabel’s framework: 
 
the process of strategic reflection and hedging against risk gives rise to a 
proliferation of hybrid forms…. Hence the predominance of hybrid, mixed, 
and intermediate forms… over polar types has proved to be the empirical 
rule rather than the exception…. The interpenetration of strategies and 
practices within industries and national economies at any one time resulting 
from actors’ efforts to hedge their organizational and technological bets 
about future changes in the environment casts inevitable doubt on the pos-
sibility of drawing sharp distinctions between epochs…. [I]t seems more 
useful to distinguish historical epochs according to changing orientations 
towards [what is] regarded as normal or paradigmatic than to divide history 
into periods where social life was in fact thoroughly organized according to 
one or another master principle. 
 
 THE DIVERSE ECOLOGY OF ELECTRONIC MATERIALS  221 
Zeitlin mentions “technological bets” in this passage, but the pre-
dominant use of the historical alternatives approach has been in tracing the 
evolution of organizational forms. As both business historians (including, 
surely, Zeitlin) and historians of technology would acknowledge, however, 
the distinction between a technological bet and an organizational one is 
often fuzzy. Organizations that last continually adjust, and adjust them-
selves to, the technologies they use. 
With that in mind, it should be clear that the historical alternatives 
approach can help us undermine the stark polarities of the standard narra-
tive of microelectronics. Electromechanical switches continued in use long 
after the invention of the vacuum tube, and are still one of the dominant 
and obdurate forms of interface between users and their electri-
cal/electronic devices (Plotnick, 2012). For many years, vacuum tubes pos-
sessed decisive advantages over transistors for certain applications. Indeed, 
in a few niches, such as high-end audio, tubes still live on (Downes, 2009). 
The shift from tubes to transistors was therefore gradual and still only par-
tial. So was the later shift from the discrete transistor to the integrated cir-
cuit. Even though integrated circuits are ubiquitous today, when they were 
invented in the late 1950s they initially only offered advantages for a few, 
mostly military, applications. For most consumer electronics products, such 
as “transistor radios”, the discrete transistor was the reasonable choice for 
many years. Moreover, the (still incomplete) transition from discrete com-
ponents to integrated circuits featured a long period in which hybrids of the 
two were at the leading edge – rather similar to the long period of hybrid 
gas and electric cars in the late 19th century (Mom, 2004). Perhaps the most 
commercially important computer of all time – IBM’s System/360, first 
sold in 1965 – used a hybrid chip architecture known as Solid Logic Tech-
nology, in which various sub-circuits were baked together as discrete com-
ponents, but the sub-circuits themselves were monolithic integrated circuits 
(Bassett, 2007, p. 67). 
The development of alternatives in parallel with each other, and the 
emergence of hybrids between alternatives, characterizes the history of elec-
tronics and computing from the systems level (whole computers and their 
peripherals) all the way down to the materials from which those systems are 
composed. At the systems level, historians of computing are beginning to 
grapple with the fact that analog computers co-existed with – and in some 
applications outcompeted – digital computers for much longer than the old 
celebratory narratives acknowledged (Cohn 2013). At the level of materials, 
Brock (2009), Lécuyer and Ueyama (2013), and a few others have begun to 
flesh out the diverse ecology of electronic materials that complemented, 
competed with, undergirded, and extended the dominance of silicon. 
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Foregrounding that diversity might, to the uncharitable, simply seem 
like giving ribbons to the also-rans. The history of microelectronics is filled 
with side streets branching away from silicon, but so far all of those have 
turned out to be dead ends or, at best, culs-de-sac serving some limited 
“neighborhood” of applications. For instance, compound semiconductors 
– semiconductors composed of more than one element, such as gallium 
arsenide or gallium nitride – have been promoted for decades for their theo-
retical superiority to silicon. So far, though, compound semiconductors have 
found only niche service in lasers, light emitting diodes (LEDs), and some 
solar cells. For most microelectronics applications, silicon really has been 
dominant, in some sense, for more than a half century. My intent here is not 
to romanticize the unsuccessful underdogs. 
Still, there are good reasons to pay more attention to the diverse eco-
logy of electronic materials – the mutually supporting tools and materials 
such as lithographic steppers, advanced cleaning pads, and photochemical 
resists that combine to allow fabrication of complex chips. One reason is 
simply that the kinds of actors who pursued quixotic alternatives to silicon 
are intrinsically interesting. For those not inclined to arguments from in-
trinsic interest, however, I would point out that the same actors were also 
often people who made important contributions elsewhere in science, con-
tributions that might not be fully intelligible without examining their inte-
rest in alternative electronic materials. David Brock and David Laws (2012), 
for instance, have examined the history of a superconducting device called 
the cryotron which competed with the transistor in the late ‘50s and early 
‘60s, after which it fell from view entirely. The people who developed the 
cryotron included Dick Garwin, famous both in gravitational radiation phy-
sics and ballistic missile defense policymaking, and Ken Shoulders and Du-
dley Buck, early pioneers of electron beam lithography. John Bremer (2007) 
makes the case that the first “integrated circuit” was not the semiconduc-
tor-based circuit invented independently by Jack Kilby and Robert Noyce, 
but rather a superconducting cryotron circuit made by Buck and Shoulders. 
Narratives that embrace a larger, more diverse ecology of electronic 
materials also allow us to see constraints on innovation that would not be 
apparent from an exclusive focus on silicon. A computer or gadget is more 
than a chip. The materials that go into user interfaces, such as liquid crystals 
(Gross, 2011), have often suggested certain applications or innovation 
pathways and discouraged others. So have the materials used in power sys-
tems, especially mobile power supplies incorporated in portable electronic 
devices (Hintz, 2009; Eisler, 2012). If one looks at microelectronics from 
the perspective of power supplies, the trajectory of innovation in making 
transistors draw less power becomes more obvious than the oft-celebrated 
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trajectory of making transistors smaller and faster. Similarly, if you look at 
microelectronics from the perspective of the materials in which a chip is 
packaged (rather than the materials in the chip itself), then the geographic 
focus of your story moves from Silicon Valley to industrial districts in Tai-
wan and elsewhere (Tinn, 2012). 
I could point to other reasons to pursue an historical alternatives ap-
proach to electronic materials, and no doubt there are good reasons I’ve 
overlooked. For the rest of this article, though, I want to concentrate on 
applying this framework to the organizations that pursued quixotic alterna-
tives to silicon. Acknowledging the diversity of the electronic materials eco-
logy tells us a great deal about the organizations that fostered innovation in 
electronics in general (including in silicon). It also tells us a great deal about 
the evolution of R&D organizations in general, both in and out of electro-
nics and at the thick boundaries between the center and periphery of the 
electronics industry. In microelectronics, new materials co-emerged with 
new organizational forms throughout the 20th century, and will continue to 
do so in the 21st. And, again, many of the individuals involved in promoting 
(or at least exploring) new materials for microelectronics have also promo-
ted new ways of organizing research on materials for microelectronics. 
To give a sense of why organizations matter in the search for new 
materials, let me juxtapose two extended quotes. The first is from Zeitlin 
(2007, p. 120-123) again, fleshing out the historical alternatives framework: 
 
the hallmark of this approach is its emphasis on the salience of alternative 
possibilities, contingency, and strategic choice in the development of mo-
dern industry…. [T]echnology and organization should not be taken as 
fixed, given, or even latent parameters to which economic actors must per-
force adjust, but rather as objects of strategic reflection and deliberate expe-
rimentation in their own right…. Economic actors … are often at least as 
concerned with determining, in the double sense of figuring out and sha-
ping, the context they are in – market, technological, institutional – as with 
pursuing their advantage within any particular context…. Crucial to this 
process of strategic reflection is the capacity of economic agents to imagine 
and weigh up alternative courses of action, connecting the present with 
both the future and the past through narratives which constitute their iden-
tities and interests. 
 
My second quote comes from Rolf Landauer, an IBM physicist pro-
bably best known for his work on the theoretical minimum amount of 
energy required to erase a single bit of information. Within the wider phy-
sics community this result is usually remembered as (possibly) disproving 
the possibility of Maxwell’s Demon (Wright, 2016). Within IBM, however, 
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Landauer is remembered as “an outstanding scientific and technical mana-
ger of IBM’s Watson Research Laboratory, guiding it from relative obscuri-
ty to become by 1970 one of the world’s two most important and innova-
tive engineering and scientific laboratories” (Bennett & Fowler, 2009, p. 1). 
Much of what Landauer did at the Watson Lab (more commonly re-
ferred to as IBM Yorktown) was to help determine – in Zeitlin’s double 
sense – the ultimate limits to the miniaturization of microelectronics in or-
der to aid executives in choosing which material basis for microelectronic 
circuits would facilitate the firm’s progress toward those ultimate limits 
ahead of its competitors. One of the critical functions of people like Lan-
dauer, therefore, was to provide Zeitlin’s “strategic reflection” by “ima-
gin[ing] and weigh[ing] up alternative courses of action”. After a whole ca-
reer of this kind of work, Landauer (1993) looked back in this way: 
 
There are many advanced technology proposals which become major 
thrusts, only to be abandoned again subsequently. An adventurous techno-
logical climate has to reward the taking of risk, and must allow failures…. 
Among the many supposedly broadly applicable logic proposals we have 
seen come and go, we can find Gunn effect logic, tunnel diodes, ferrite core 
logic, schemes utilizing combinations of electroluminescent devices and 
photoconductors, fluid logic, parametric microwave excitation and Joseph-
son junctions. Some technological candidates, such as Josephson junction 
logic, magnetic bubble storage, or the battery powered automobile, did de-
serve real examination. When they are discarded, it is done with trepidation, 
and knowledge that the decision may not last forever. 
 
Landauer’s quote supports my point that we can use the historical al-
ternatives approach to understand the history of microelectronics, particu-
larly in terms of the material basis of microelectronic technologies but also 
in understanding the function of microelectronics firms’ corporate research 
laboratories. That is, corporate labs in Landauer’s era served, in part, as 
places where “advanced technology proposals” could be incubated to the 
point where they could receive “real examination” and either be pursued or 
“abandoned”. 
Landauer adds his own take, though. If you read the whole article 
I’ve just quoted from, he argues that these various alternatives often receive 
more attention than they deserve because their proponents vocally promote 
their advantages but not their shortcomings, whereas potential detractors 
(such as Landauer himself) have little motivation to weigh in negatively un-
til very late in the game. It’s a point that goes a long way toward explaining 
IBM’s rich history of exploring alternative microelectronic materials, de-
vices, and manufacturing processes at enormous cost. Yet the skepticism of 
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people like Landauer meant IBM only rarely adopted adventurous alterna-
tives. 
Indeed, in a few famous cases – most famously CMOS transistors – 
IBM invented and/or developed alternative microelectronics technologies, 
only to discard them before being forced by the rest of the industry to re-
adopt the technology later on. Other giant corporate research labs expe-
rienced similar misadventures in the 1970s and 1980s, such as Xerox 
PARC’s “losing” the graphical user interface to Apple and Microsoft (Smith 
& Alexander, 1988). Such mishaps contributed to the long-term reorganiza-
tion of corporate research since the 1980s in which industry has downsized 
in-house research and nearly abandoned in-house long-range or fundamen-
tal research (Khan, Hounshell, & Fuchs, 2015). 
 
 
A Semiconductor Industry No More 
To give a sense of how the search for novel electronic materials contributed 
directly to the decline of corporate long-range research, let me focus on an 
episode that is obliquely alluded to in the Landauer quote above. Note how 
Landauer assigns a particularly ambiguous status to one “broadly applicable 
logic proposal”: the Josephson junction. On the one hand, Josephson junc-
tions are thrown in with a pile of other failures. On the other hand, Lan-
dauer sets Josephson logic apart as the only such proposal to “deserve real 
examination”. He even hints that, though Josephson was abandoned, it 
might – unlike its peers – come back someday. 
So what is Josephson logic? In the early 1960s, a young British gra-
duate student, Brian Josephson, made a series of striking predictions regar-
ding the behavior of certain kinds of superconducting circuits – work for 
which he shared the 1973 Nobel Prize in Physics (when he was just 33). 
Those ideas were quickly taken up by research labs at several large US 
firms, including AT&T, IBM, General Electric, and even Ford Motor 
Company. Interest at IBM focused on ways of applying Josephson’s ideas 
to constructing circuits with extreme rapid switching times – i.e., circuits 
that would be useful in high-speed computing. 
The Josephson junction’s promise was quickly made evident to IBM 
management. The early work  
 
culminated in 1966 in demonstration of subnanosecond switching of Jo-
sephson tunneling devices, and in 1967 in the operation of a thin-film Jo-
sephson device flip-flop, both indicating that Josephson switching devices 
could indeed be switched very fast and could be competitive with projected 
semiconductor integrated circuits. On the basis of these encouraging re-
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sults, the pros and cons of Josephson devices were assessed and an initially 
small research program was launched in 1967 with the aim of studying 
technological and system aspects. (Anacker, 1980, p. 108) 
 
The Josephson project was commissioned partly on the basis of the 
novel characteristics of superconducting circuits. IBM was committed to 
leading in basic research, and superconducting materials were attractive on 
that basis both as a topic of fundamental intrinsic interest, and potentially 
as key constituents of scientific instruments that could be used in space 
science, biomedical research, and other areas. 
However, IBM was also keen to push into Josephson junctions be-
cause of worries that further circuit miniaturization would not be possible 
for much longer with silicon, and therefore that alternative materials nee-
ded to be explored. That view was most vigorously put forward by Robert 
Keyes, a physicist and close friend of Landauer’s (he wrote one of Lan-
dauer’s National Academies obituaries and is mentioned as a confidante in 
another). In “Physical Problems and Limits in Computer Logic” and “Phy-
sical Limits in Digital Electronics”, Keyes (1969 and 1975) warned that po-
wer dissipation, in particular, was a rapidly approaching problem, and poin-
ted to a variety of exotic technologies that might provide at least temporary 
relief. 
 
The stunning success of silicon semiconductor technology for information 
processing has not completely stifled the search for alternative technological 
bases for memory and logic. In the first place, although progress in silicon 
technology seems certain to continue and to provide ever-more-capable and 
economic general-purpose computers, quantum leaps or revolutions cannot 
be predicted with confidence; if forthcoming it appears that they must be 
sought elsewhere…. Thus there has been interest in and research related to 
logic based on superconducting devices, fluid devices, magnetic bubbles, 
and even optical devices, in the past decade. Superconducting devices based 
on the Josephson tunneling cryotron appear to be the most likely candidate 
for logic that will make a much larger, faster computer possible; a Joseph-
son gate that switches in only picoseconds and has a power dissipation of 
microwatts has been described. (Keyes, 1975, p. 760) 
 
In other words, Keyes was urging his firm to experiment with – and 
to engage in “strategic reflection” about – a whole host of “historical alter-
natives” to the silicon integrated circuit. And of those alternatives, Joseph-
son computing seemed to be the most promising. 
IBM heeded that call, and through the early ‘70s its Josephson pro-
gram gradually grew, generating know-how and patents that would protect 
IBM’s position if the technology took off. Other firms, especially AT&T 
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and Sperry, established smaller Josephson groups as, in essence, fast follo-
wers behind IBM so that they could catch up if need be – again, exactly 
what one would expect in a world dominated by uncertain choices among 
historical alternatives rather than binary transitions from one technological 
state to another. The US National Security Agency, as well, became interes-
ted in Josephson computing as a potential enabler of ultrafast cryptography. 
A small group at NSA conducted in-house research shadowing IBM and 
other firms, and at the same time began contributing about a quarter of the 
IBM project’s funding. 
By the late ‘70s, Josephson technology had progressed far enough 
that upper management deemed it ready to transition from “R” to “D”. 
The size of the project swelled, to about 125 personnel and a $20 million 
annual budget in the early ‘80s. Yet as superconducting chips came tantali-
zingly close to production, the project became increasingly dependent on 
exactly the semiconductor personnel and expertise that Josephson technology 
was to supplant. As one of the leaders of the project put it in a review ar-
ticle, 
 
A computer made up of Josephson junctions constitutes a radical departure 
from a well-established semiconductor technology. The fabrication of Jo-
sephson-junction components relies, however, almost entirely on methods 
learned in the development of semiconductor devices. The substrate mate-
rial chosen for the Josephson-junction chips is silicon, not because of its 
conducting properties but because techniques for forming precise micros-
copic structures on silicon are well established. Circuit patterns are defined 
photolithographically, as they are in making semiconductor devices. (Mati-
soo, 1980) 
 
In other words, the Josephson team needed IBM’s silicon manufac-
turing experts to adapt their technology for mass production, at just the 
same time that Josephson technology was maturing to the point that its po-
tential could be measured directly against that of silicon, with the possibility 
that silicon could lose. 
In 1980, IBM’s Director of Research, Ralph Gomory, convened an 
“Extendibility Study” to make that direct comparison between Josephson 
and silicon technology, with the aim of deciding whether the company 
would halt the project or continue following the Josephson path in parallel 
with silicon. In the end, though, the study estimated that with another de-
cade of development Josephson chips could be three to six times faster than 
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silicon bipolar junction chips.1 That forecast was ambiguous enough that 
the company continued on with the Josephson project, though its research-
oriented leader, Wilhelm Anacker, was replaced by Joe Logue, a manager 
with deep expertise in semiconductor manufacturing and product develop-
ment. Like most of IBM’s silicon establishment, though, Logue was skepti-
cal of Josephson technology’s potential, and took the job only on the pro-
mise that it would come up for another moment of strategic reflection in 
two years’ time (Logue, 1998). 
Accordingly, in 1983 Gomory commissioned another extendibility 
study, this time to compare Josephson technology, bipolar silicon chips, 
and gallium arsenide, another of the perennial contenders to unseat silicon. 
This time, Josephson was found to be even less competitive relative to sili-
con than just three years earlier. Both Josephson and gallium arsenide cir-
cuits possessed theoretical advantages over silicon, and in small, simple de-
vices those theoretical advantages had in fact been realized. But the 1983 
extendibility study forecast that over the foreseeable future any mass-
produced, complex chip based on either Josephson junctions or gallium 
arsenide would most likely have too small (if any) advantage over silicon to 
justify the cost of the firm’s investment. IBM had reflected strategically, and 
concluded that it should not follow the alternative path of Josephson com-
puting. And so, on September 23, 1983, the program was canceled (Robin-
son, 1983). 
 
 
Back to the Bench 
The Josephson program was by no means IBM’s only foray into al-
ternatives to silicon, but it grew larger and progressed significantly further 
than similar efforts. Based on estimates in the trade press at the time and 
interviews with participants, I believe the whole program probably cost on 
the order of a quarter billion of today’s dollars – not small change, but also 
not a risky expenditure for a company as dominant as IBM at the time. The 
firm’s return on that investment is hard to specify, but it would have inclu-
ded: a substantial patent portfolio, some key personnel (including several 
who helped save IBM from bankruptcy in the early ‘90s), and some admi-
ring press coverage that reinforced the company’s image as innovator. Indi-
rectly, the Josephson program helped four IBM scientists win shares in two 
separate Nobel Prizes for Physics. The first, in 1986 for the scanning tun-
neling microscope, originated in part as an attempt to characterize ultrathin 
                                                     
1 Emerson Pugh et al. (1980), Josephson Extendibility Study, in IBM Archives, Box 
475, Folder 1 of 8 (# 8 in box), 1-1. 
 THE DIVERSE ECOLOGY OF ELECTRONIC MATERIALS  229 
superconducting films used in the Josephson program. The second, in 1987 
for high-temperature superconductivity, was inspired by the program’s 
search for better superconductors, and was aided by conversations with the 
program’s superconductivity experts. During the late-’80s frenzy over high-
temperature superconductors, the Josephson program gave IBM a lea-
dership position in the field and a stake in reactive policy initiatives such as 
the Consortium for Superconducting Electronics. 
The Josephson program also generated two pieces of critical self-
knowledge that IBM slowly absorbed over the next decade. First, it learned 
that Josephson junctions were not the way forward and therefore that – at 
least in terms of microelectronics – IBM would remain a semiconductor 
firm and not a superconductor firm. That might seem an expensive lesson, 
but it allowed IBM (and all of the other firms that had been carefully wat-
ching it) to more efficiently allocate resources, particularly during the early 
‘80s semiconductor boom associated with the first personal computer 
craze. And, obvious as it might seem, Josephson’s non-viability was a les-
son other organizations – notably the NSA and Japan’s Ministry of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry – would continue to pay millions to learn over 
the ensuing decades. The theoretical speed and power advantage of super-
conducting electronics over semiconductors tempted MITI and the NSA 
even after the IBM program, and continue to lure smaller research groups 
even today. 
At the same time, IBM learned from the Josephson program that it 
needed to change the way its research and manufacturing arms worked with 
each other. Over the course of the ‘80s, IBM Research would slowly be-
come more product-oriented and less attached to basic, long-range investi-
gation. That lesson would only be fully absorbed, however, after the com-
pany’s early-’90s brush with bankruptcy. To keep IBM from dissolving, 
Josephson project veterans such as Carl Anderson, Juri Matisoo, and Mark 
Ketchen were called in to move IBM from a Cold War business model to a 
post-Fordist, Third Industrial Revolution (Dosi & Galambos, 2013) model 
– though, nodding to Zeitlin again, it’s important to acknowledge that that 
transition was not as sudden as the metaphor of “revolutions” implies, and 
that older and hybrid forms continue to compete with more purely post-
Fordist models. 
These were exactly the kinds of side-benefits that large Cold War era 
corporate research laboratories in the US were supposed to accrue from 
their curiosity-driven exploration of fundamental questions. From the ‘50s 
to the early ‘80s, labs such as IBM Yorktown and Bell Labs were well-
resourced and loosely steered, with the expectation that not all – in fact, 
quite few – of the alternative paths they wandered down would yield viable 
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products or processes. Basic research allowed firms to hedge their bets by 
examining alternative technologies that might, potentially, displace their 
core products. But corporate basic research also helped firms train new ge-
nerations of managers; it reinforced those firms’ reputations for innovation 
(and, implicitly, a continually improving product line); and it saved firms 
money in the form of hefty tax incentives favoring basic research (Asner, 
2006). 
As the Cold War gradually wound down and the global economy be-
came more competitive, however, all of those justifications for basic corpo-
rate research diminished. Ironically, that led some of the most vocal sup-
porters of these labs’ reflection on alternatives to become prominent 
skeptics of that strategy. As Landauer’s obituarists (Bennett & Fowler, 
2009, p. 10) put it, for instance, “he understood what was needed to build a 
computer very well and along with Robert Keyes tried to pass such kno-
wledge to the promoters of every cockamamie scheme that emerged. As a 
result he took a dim view of optical computing, [and] logic based on thres-
hold devices, such as Esaki diodes and Josephson junctions”. Keyes (1992) 
made a similar point, somewhat less colorfully: 
 
The differences between the environments in a large [information proces-
sing] system and in a laboratory are often not recognized with the result that 
the essential attributes are missing in device proposals [e.g., single-electron 
transistors, cellular automata, and molecular electronics]. Thus, although 
many proposals for devices have been put forward, only three, the relay, the 
vacuum tube, and the transistor, have proven able to meet the requirements 
and form the basis of large computing systems. 
 
Here we see the harsh lessons of IBM’s Josephson computing foray 
brought to bear on all non-silicon, non-transistor microelectronics. 
And yet, many many varieties of non-silicon, non-transistor microe-
lectronics are still being actively promoted as potential future replacements 
for silicon transistors. Vast programs run by individual manufacturers, in-
dustrial consortia, and government agencies such as DARPA exist to ma-
nage research into those alternatives and to incubate them until they might 
be ready to move into production. However, that research is organized very 
differently than it was in the era of the IBM Josephson program. Back then, 
semiconductor manufacturing was still quite vertically integrated, at least at 
large firms like IBM. That vertical integration included research – once 
IBM bet big on Josephson in the early ‘70s, its program depended dispro-
portionately on in-house expertise. Today, semiconductor manufacturing is 
almost completely dis-integrated. Firms specialize in chip design, chip fa-
brication, packaging, tool development, even research – but virtually no 
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firm does it all (and few do more than one of those activities). Thus, manu-
facturers need to depend on outside actors to elaborate possible alternatives 
to silicon. Industrial research consortia are one possibility; government la-
boratories are another. Increasingly, though, firms look to academic resear-
chers – or to consortia and government agencies that manage a portfolio of 
academic researchers (Khan, Hounshell & Fuchs, 2015) – to bring alterna-
tive microelectronics materials closer to the market. 
 
 
C60 and Fullerene Materials as/and Electronics Research 
To better understand the semiconductor industry’s increasing de-
pendence on academic research, I want to finish with a brief outline of a 
story which is justly famous in the history of recent chemistry – namely, the 
discovery of buckminsterfullerene (or C60), for which Harry Kroto (former-
ly of the University of Sussex in the UK) and Bob Curl and Rick Smalley 
(both of Rice University in the US) received the 1996 Nobel Prize in Che-
mistry. A small cottage industry of popular histories and professional histo-
rical, social scientific, philosophical, and literary studies of the fullerene dis-
covery has accumulated in the thirty-plus years since C60 was announced 
(Aldersey-Williams, 1995; Baggott, 1994; Ball, 1994; Bueno, 2006; Sparrow, 
2007; Kaplan & Radin, 2011; Broadhead & Howard, 2011; Eisler, 2013; 
McCray, 2013; Moskowitz, 2016). This literature has delineated several con-
texts which fostered the discovery of C60 and/or its discoverers’ later work 
– most notably space science and futurist “visioneering”. However, virtually 
none of these studies has foregrounded fullerene chemistry’s more mun-
dane if equally extensive connections with microelectronics. 
The standard story usually begins with the fortuitous advent of the 
Kroto-Curl-Smalley collaboration. As a postdoc at the University of Chica-
go, Smalley had invented an apparatus for making spectroscopic measure-
ments of very small, very cold clusters of atoms. A version of that device 
which he and his students built at Rice – known as the AP2 – was the cen-
ter of his research program and formed the basis for collaborations with 
Curl. When Kroto encountered Curl at a conference in the early 1980s, the 
AP2 came up in conversation and Kroto seized on it as the means to inves-
tigate the chemical makeup of matter in interstellar space – an environment 
he believed contained a variety of very cold, very small clusters of carbon 
atoms which he thought could be simulated in the environment of the AP2. 
In the late summer/early fall of 1985, Smalley finally agreed to generate 
carbon clusters with the AP2, Kroto flew to Houston, and over the next 
few weeks Curl, Kroto, Smalley, and the latter’s graduate students stumbled 
on, and struggled to interpret, data indicating the presence of a molecule 
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made up of sixty carbon atoms forming a closed cage – C60, the third 
known allotrope of pure carbon after diamond and graphite. 
This narrative of heroic serendipity amidst curiosity-driven research 
leaves a great deal obscure. Elsewhere in this volume, Sacha Loeve suggests 
how we might situate this episode in the long history of carbon allotropes. 
What I’ll do here, instead, is to situate Smalley’s contribution to this episode 
within the long history of research on electronic materials. At the time Kro-
to first suggested examining carbon, Smalley was studying the reactivity of 
small clusters (today we would call them nanoclusters) of semiconductor mate-
rials. The AP2 was originally built to study metal clusters, but in the months 
before C60 was discovered Smalley’s group (in collaboration with Curl and a 
Rice electrical engineering professor, Frank Tittel) had moved on to exami-
ning whether semiconductor clusters differ significantly from metal ones 
(they do). Because semiconductor properties can vary wildly in the presence 
of even minute amounts of impurities, Smalley was afraid that vaporizing a 
carbon disc in the AP2 would contaminate any future experiments with 
silicon, germanium, or gallium arsenide in the same apparatus. Therefore, 
he refused to do Kroto’s carbon experiment until after he had finished 
working on semiconductor clusters with the AP2. 
The AP2 semiconductor cluster experiments were, in a sense, the 
kind of incremental basic research that scientists sometimes describe as 
“picking the low-hanging fruit”. Smalley had an experimental apparatus, 
and the periodic table provided a menu of elements and simple compounds 
to put in it. Semiconductor clusters, in that light, were epistemically no dif-
ferent from the metal clusters they followed or the carbon clusters they 
preceded. But epistemology is one thing; gaining the resources to do an 
actual experiment, and then using that experiment to gain further resources 
– what Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1986, p. 231) referred to as the 
cycle of credit – is another. 
Semiconductor research, of course, has a large, well-resourced au-
dience with specific technological aims in mind which Smalley, et al. played 
to in setting up their experiments with semiconductor nanoclusters – as 
seen in the introduction to one of their articles: 
 
Driven by the extreme technological importance of new breeds of semi-
conducting materials, there has been quite an active interest in theoretical 
models of III-V semiconductors…. Virtually all theoretical approaches to 
semiconductor surfaces and interfaces start with a relatively small cluster of 
atoms and… compare to bulk surface measurements… [T]here is still a po-
tentially severe mismatch between the essentially microscopic theory and 
essentially macroscopic experiments. One appealing way out… is… by de-
veloping techniques for generating and probing the very clusters the theory 
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is best able to handle. Certainly this will not be a universal solution. Particu-
larly for semiconductors (where the major device-driven interest often fo-
cuses on such intrinsically macroscopic phenomena as depletion layers, 
etc.), not all properties of bulk interfaces will be accessible through the stu-
dy of microscopic clusters. But the crucial short-range phenomena… occur 
in the small clusters as well. (O’Brien et al., 1986) 
 
Notably, the large discs of silicon, germanium, and gallium arsenide 
used in these experiments came from Texas Instruments, and one of the 
Ph.D. students working on the project, Sean O’Brien, went on from Rice to 
work for TI. Indeed, TI probably assisted Smalley more because they ho-
ped to recruit his graduate students than because they thought his research 
findings would help them manufacture circuits (which they didn’t). 
With the (initially contested) discovery of C60, Smalley’s work on se-
miconductor clusters was put on a back burner, and has been forgotten in 
the popular and scholarly historiography. No wonder – Smalley’s most-
cited semiconductor cluster article has received less than 1% of the cita-
tions of the article announcing C60. Yet that disparity was still somewhat 
contingent. By the late 1980s, Smalley was satisfied that he had overcome 
all possible objections to the C60 model he, Kroto, and Curl had proposed, 
but he still could not make enough C60 to analyze using bulk characteriza-
tion tools. The amount that could be learned about C60 seemed to be di-
sappointingly constrained. 
So Smalley began to wind down his fullerene work and returned to 
the semiconductor cluster research he had been working on before C60. As 
the title of a talk by a Smalley student in 1989 put it (perhaps in deliberate 
contrast to C60 research), “Silicon Is Never Boring”.2 In the early 1990s, 
however, three discoveries convinced Smalley to return to carbon-cage ma-
terials (generically known as “fullerenes”). First, in 1990 Donald Huffman 
and Wolfgang Krätschmer discovered an astonishingly simple process for 
making larger quantities of buckyballs. Simply by running an electric arc 
across two graphite rods in a helium atmosphere at reduced pressure, they 
could make enough C60 to analyze with an infrared spectrometer. Suddenly, 
a lot more became known about buckyballs very quickly. Smalley (1991) 
referred to this as “C60, Chapter 2”. 
Chapter 2, as it turned out, moved quickly away from buckyballs and 
toward carbon nanotubes. Both were closed cages of pure carbon, but 
                                                     
2  Poster for RQI Informal Seminar/Discussion Series talk by Mike Alford (1989), 
“Silicon Is Never Boring: Some New Results of Silicon Cluster Ion Reactivity”, 
September 22, Rice Quantum Institute information file, Woodson Research Cen-
ter, Fondren Library, Rice University. 
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Smalley could foresee much more interesting electrical and mechanical pro-
perties for the elongated nanotubes than for their spherical cousins. The 
year 1991 saw the first production of macroscopic quantities of multiwalled 
carbon nanotubes. Then in 1993 came the discovery of single-walled nano-
tubes (or SWNTs) – notably, by groups at microelectronics giants NEC and 
IBM. Smalley dubbed single-walled tubes “the world’s most perfect mate-
rial” and dedicated the rest of his career to making, understanding, and ap-
plying them. 
But perfect for what? Most scholarly attention to Smalley has focu-
sed on the rhetorical connections he spun from nanotube research to futu-
ristic applications of nanotechnology such as Eric Drexler’s “molecular as-
semblers” or a “space elevator” lifting people and goods from earth’s 
surface to geosynchronous orbit. Indeed, Smalley used both Drexler and 
the space elevator in his attempts to persuade federal policymakers and 
university administrators and donors to support nanotechnology research. 
Yet even a cursory glance at Smalley’s public and private writings shows 
that the microelectronics applications of nanotubes and other nanomate-
rials pervaded his outlook. Smalley used the social capital that he accrued 
from the buckyball discovery largely to persuade Rice to hire a cohort of 
physicists, chemists, and electrical engineers with expertise in exotic elec-
tronic materials such as quantum dots and so-called “molecular electro-
nics”. In the wake of the discovery of nanotubes, he re-oriented his own 
research to figuring how to make large quantities of high-quality nanotubes 
for any application, yet he consistently maintained that it was the microelec-
tronics applications of nanotubes which were most achievable and would 
be most profitable. Smalley was incredibly eager to form collaborations 
with groups both inside and outside Rice to develop microelectronics ap-
plications of nanotubes, to the point of submitting a proposal to the NSF 
in 1998 for a multi-sited Center for Carbon Nanotechnology with “nano-
electronics” as its top objective. 
By 1998, Smalley was also preparing to found a company to manu-
facture tubes. In anticipation of that move, he spoke with Business Week 
about nanotubes’ commercial potential, focusing almost exclusively on their 
microelectronics applications: 
 
Q: What makes buckytubes compelling to industry? 
A: Take a look at the preface and introductory sections of Sematech’s Na-
tional Technology Road Map for the Semiconductor Industry, 1997…. The notion 
that they will have to leave silicon was discussed in depth. They see so many 
problems on the horizon that they can’t get around. So now they are ready 
to think about things like carbon. 
Q: That’s a big departure. 
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A: Yes. And this gets back to the old dreams of “molecular electronics”.… 
There is a huge electronics industry, well in excess of $200 billion a year, 
with a great desire to maintain Moore’s Law for another 50 years. It’s likely 
that tens of billions of dollars will be spent on breaking the 100-nanometer 
barrier. And the only thing on the other side of that barrier is molecular 
electronics…. In the 1970s, there was much discussion of molecular elec-
tronics, but nothing came of it, mostly because people didn’t have good 
molecular metallic wires. But now it looks like we do, and the name is 
“buckytube”. (Anonymous, 1998) 
 
Nor was Smalley alone in predicting that nanotubes would soon lead 
to the overthrow of silicon by molecular electronics – IBM and other big 
companies were also pursuing that goal, as were many academic resear-
chers. 
In fact, the main customers for Smalley’s company, Carbon Nano-
technologies Inc., were microelectronics firms. Samsung (Anonymous, 
2008), for instance, repeatedly said it was close to marketing a display sys-
tem incorporating nanotube emitters (some bought from CNI). Mobile 
phone makers, too, reportedly experimented with using nanotubes as addi-
tives in their glass touch screens (Hecht, 2009). In 2007, CNI merged with 
another firm (Unidym), which was then sold in 2011 to another Korean 
electronics company (Wisepower), “a leading supplier of Li-polymer batte-
ries for mobile appliances” (Anonymous, 2011). Today, Unidym’s corpo-
rate tag-line is “carbon for electronics”. Its one market success seems to 
have come from Entegris, a maker of the trays on which silicon wafers are 
carried in semiconductor fabs – an application where even the tiny decrease 
in dust and flaking caused by incorporating nanotubes into the tray’s plastic 
matrix could justify the enormous expense of using one of the world’s most 
exotic materials (Anonymous, 2014). That is, the microelectronics industry 
is so vast and depends on so many different high-performance technolo-
gies, that any time a new wonder material such as the carbon nanotube is 
invented, the microelectronics industry can probably find multiple ways of 
using it. 
The Smalley-fullerene case gives a good sense of how academic 
chemists, materials scientists, and allied researchers increasingly spin their 
work as relevant to – perhaps even as a panacea for – the microelectronics 
industry, to great effect. At every step, no matter what experimental mate-
rial or apparatus or research institution he was working with, Smalley could 
successfully siphon resources from firms, donors, and government agencies 
by constructing a plausible narrative about how that apparatus, material, 
and/or institution was going to extend Moore’s Law and revolutionize elec-
tronics. But Smalley’s case also points to the parallelism and hybridity of 
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research on electronic materials. He helped discover C60 in the midst of 
work on semiconductor clusters – work he returned to when C60 research 
stagnated, then abandoned with the nanotube boom of the early ‘90s. Yet 
he used that boom to bring resources not just to nanotube microelectronics 
research but also to people studying other electronic materials such as qui-
nones and quantum dots. 
As Sacha Loeve’s chapter explains, the fullerene research community 
Smalley helped found has continued to spit out new candidates for electro-
nic wonder-material, most recently graphene (which yielded a Nobel Prize 
in 2010). And yet, all that activity has displaced silicon only a little bit sym-
bolically, and not at all commercially. In fact, silicon is indispensable to re-
search on graphene and molecular electronics, whether as the substrate on 
which those alternative materials rest, or as the material for which nanoli-
thographic methods were first developed but which are now applied in gra-
phene and molecular electronics research. Moreover, as the Unidym 
example shows, even when silicon outcompetes an alternative material such 
as carbon nanotubes, that material may still find an application in the larger 
ecology of materials used in the manufacture of silicon integrated circuits. 
The relationship between bench and brand is complicated indeed. 
 
 
Conclusion 
What I’ve tried to get across in these two case studies is some sense 
of how the task of considering alternative materials for microelectronics 
was re-organized in the late Cold War and post-Cold War periods. During 
the Cold War, firms invented their own alternatives to silicon, observed 
alternatives to silicon that originated in competing firms, and pursued paral-
lel lines of research in-house to aid in the process of strategic reflection as 
to whether to abandon silicon in favor of something else. Academic re-
search on alternatives to silicon existed, of course, but firms prized that re-
search primarily as a source of personnel who could be recruited into cor-
porate labs, rather than as a source of knowledge that they could directly put 
to use. 
Curiously, though, academic training was often only indirectly rele-
vant to the future careers of corporate researchers. Many of the people who 
participated in the IBM Josephson program had virtually no experience 
with superconductivity – or even microelectronics – before joining IBM. If 
they did have a background in microelectronics, it was more likely to be in 
semiconductors than superconductors. Even previous corporate experience 
was poorly predictive of an individual’s future industrial research. People 
like Richard Garwin bounced merrily from superconducting electronics to 
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meson decay to gravitational radiation research (Collins, 2010) to ballistic 
missile defense (Slayton, 2013). A few of the Josephson project personnel 
stayed in superconductivity, but most floated into other areas, often tacking 
among basic research, applied research, and technology management for 
the rest of their careers. 
By the 1980s, that style of work was becoming more common in 
academia as well (Mowery et al., 2004). Particular end-products (“brands”) 
became compelling imaginaries to motivate a wide variety of activity at the 
academic bench. The ultrafast computer, in particular, was an imaginary 
that stimulated bench-work on a tremendous range of materials. Increasin-
gly, that imaginary shaped the work of individual researchers more than 
their expertise in any given material. Rick Smalley, for instance, moved easi-
ly from semiconductor nanoclusters to buckyballs to nanotubes. The im-
portation of this industrial template for shaping the identity of the academic 
scientist has been a source of vociferous protest by some historians, philo-
sophers, and even scientists themselves (e.g., Forman, 2007). Yet it is hard 
to see how, in our current moment, it could be otherwise (Mirowski, 2011). 
The increasingly competitive post-Cold War global economy has led many 
firms in the US and elsewhere to believe that they cannot sustain any activi-
ty that spans all the way from bench to brand, much less the Cold War mo-
del of an in-house R&D portfolio consisting of multiple arcs leading from 
bench toward brand and back at the same time. 
Pathways from bench to brand within industry are now supposed to 
be short, singular, and have a high probability of success. Research that may 
or may not lead to a product over a long time horizon has therefore been 
increasingly outsourced to universities and to industrial research consortia. 
Meanwhile, research within academia is increasingly supposed to delineate a 
plausible path from bench to brand. When that pathway becomes very plau-
sible, academic researchers such as Smalley increasingly take it upon them-
selves to patent their work (and license the patent to someone who will 
turn it into a brand), and/or found their own company to shepherd their 
ideas to the marketplace themselves. Whether this increasing emphasis on 
“translation” from bench to brand (and decreasing tolerance for moves 
from brand to bench) will prove a sustainable innovation model over the 
longer term is very much unclear. 
 
 
References 
 
ALDERSEY-WILLIAMS Hugh (1995), The Most Beautiful Molecule, London, 
Aurum Press. 
238 CYRUS C. M. MODY 
ANACKER Wilhelm (1980), “Josephson Computer Technology: An IBM 
Research Project”, IBM Journal of Research and Development, vol. 24, n°2, 
p. 107-112. 
ANONYMOUS (1998), “Q&A with Richard Smalley”, Business Week, August 
24-31. 
ANONYMOUS (2008), “Unidym Announces a Demonstration by Samsung 
Electronics of the First Color Carbon Nanotube-Based Electrophoretic 
Display”, Online: http://www.unidym.com/press/pr_081016.html 
ANONYMOUS (2011), “Arrowhead Subsidiary Unidym, Inc. Acquired by 
Wisepower Co., Ltd. for up to $140 million earn-out plus $5 million 
royalties”, Online: http://www.arrowheadresearch.com/press-releases 
/arrowhead-subsidiary-unidym-inc-acquired-wisepower-co-ltd-140-
million-earn-out-plus-5 
ANONYMOUS (2014), “Case Studies: Entegris’ Advanced, Next Generation 
Reticle SMIF Pod”, Online: http://www.unidym.com/products 
/casestudies_entegris.html 
ASNER Glen Ross (2006), The Cold War and American industrial research, Ph.D. 
Thesis, Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh). 
BAGGOTT Jim (1994), Perfect Symmetry: The Accidental Discovery of 
Buckminsterfullerene, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
BALL Philip (1994), Designing the Molecular World, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
BASSETT Ross Knox (2007), To the Digital Age: Research Labs, Start-Up 
Companies, and the Rise of MOS Technology, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
BENNETT Charles H. & FOWLER Alan B. (2009), “Rolf W. Landauer 
(1927-1999)”, in Biographical Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, 
Washington, National Academy of Science, p. 1-14. 
BREMER John (2007), “The Invention of a Superconducting Integrated 
Circuit”, IEEE History Center Newsletter, vol. 75, November, p. 6-7. 
BROADHEAD Lee-Anne & HOWARD Sean (2011), “ ‘Two Cultures, One 
Frontier’: The Drexler-Smalley Debate on the Limits and Potential of 
Nanotechnology”, Techné, vol. 15, n°1, p. 23-35. 
BROCK David C. (2009), Patterning the World: The Rise of Chemically-Amplified 
Resists [Studies in Materials Innovation series], Philadelphia, Chemical 
Heritage Foundation. 
BROCK David C. & LAWS David A. (2012), “The Early History of 
Microcircuitry: An Overview”, IEEE Annals of the History of Computing, 
vol. 34, n°1, p. 7-19. 
 THE DIVERSE ECOLOGY OF ELECTRONIC MATERIALS  239 
BUENO Otávio (2006), “The Drexler-Smalley Debate on Nanotechnology: 
Incommensurability at Work?”, in Joachim SCHUMMER & Davis BAIRD 
(eds.), Nanotechnology Challenges, Singapore, World Scientific, p. 29-48. 
CHOI Hyungsub & MODY Cyrus C. M. (2009), “The Long History of 
Molecular Electronics: Microelectronics Origins of Nanotechnology”, 
Social Studies of Science, vol. 39, p. 11-50. 
COHN Julie (2013), Biography of a technology: North America’s power grid through 
the twentieth century, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Houston. 
COLLINS Harry (2010), Gravity’s Shadow: The Search for Gravitational Waves, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
DOSI Giovanni & GALAMBOS Louis (eds.) (2013), The Third Industrial 
Revolution in Business, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
DOWNES Kieran (2009), From enthusiasm to practice: Users, systems, and 
technology in high-end audio, Ph.D. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (Cambridge). 
EISLER Matthew (2012), Overpotential: Fuel Cells, Futurism, and the Making of a 
Power Panacea, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press. 
EISLER Matthew N. (2013), “ ‘The Ennobling Unity of Science and 
Technology’: Materials Science and Engineering, the Department of 
Energy, and the Nanotechnology Enigma”, Minerva, vol. 51, p. 225-251. 
FORMAN Paul (2007), “The Primacy of Science in Modernity, of 
Technology in Postmodernity, and of Ideology in the History of 
Technology”, History and Technology, vol. 23, p. 1-152. 
FRANCOEUR Eric (2002), “Cyrus Levinthal, the Kluge, and the Origins of 
Interactive Molecular Graphics”, Endeavour, vol. 26, n°4, p. 127-131. 
GROSS Benjamin H. (2011), Crystalling innovation: The emergence of the LCD at 
RCA, 1951-1976, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University. 
HECHT David (2009), “Transparent Carbon Nanotube Films Likely 
Successor to ITO [indium-tin-oxide] for Commercial Applications”, 
Online: http://phys.org/news158587561.html 
HINTZ Eric S. (2009), “Portable Power: Inventor Samuel Ruben and the 
Birth of Duracell”, Technology and Culture, vol. 50, p. 24-57. 
JOHNSON Ann (2006), “The Shape of Molecules to Come”, Sociology of the 
Sciences Yearbook, vol. 25 (Simulation), p. 25-39. 
KAPLAN Sarah & RADIN Joanna (2011), “Bounding an Emerging 
Technology: Para-Scientific Media and the Drexler-Smalley Debate 
about Nanotechnology”, Social Studies of Science, vol. 41, n°4, p. 457-485. 
KEYES Robert W. (1975), “Physical Limits in Digital Electronics”, 
Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 63, n°5, p. 740-767. 
KEYES Robert W. (1992), “Electronic Devices in Large Systems”, AIP 
Conference Proceedings, vol. 262, p. 285-297. 
240 CYRUS C. M. MODY 
KHAN Hassan Naveed, HOUNSHELL David A. & FUCHS Erica R. H. 
(2015), “Scaling Moore’s Wall: A Public-Private Partnership in Search of 
a Technological Revolution”, Online at SSRN: https://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2497218 
LANDAUER Rolf (1990), “Advanced Technology and Truth in 
Advertising”, Physica A, vol. 168, p. 75-87. 
LATOUR Bruno & WOOLGAR Steve (1986), Laboratory Life: The Construction 
of Scientific Facts, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
LÉCUYER Christophe & BROCK David C. (2006), “The Materiality of 
Microelectronics”, History and Technology, vol. 22, n°3, p. 301-325. 
LÉCUYER Christophe & UEYAMA Takahiro (2013), “The Logics of 
Materials Innovation: The Case of Gallium Nitride and Blue Light 
Emitting Diodes”, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences, vol. 43, p. 243-
280. 
LOGUE Joseph C. (1998), “From Vacuum Tubes to Very Large Scale 
Integration: A Personal Memoir”, IEEE Annals of the History of 
Computing, vol. 20, n°3, p. 55-68. 
MATISOO Juri (1980), “The Superconducting Computer”, Scientific American, 
vol. 242, n°5, p. 50-65. 
MCCRAY W. Patrick (2013), The Visioneers: How a Group of Elite Scientists 
Pursued Space Colonies, Nanotechnologies, and the Future, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
MIROWSKI Philip (2011), Science-Mart: Privatizing American Science, Cambridge 
(MA), Harvard University Press. 
MOM Gijs (2004), The Electric Vehicle: Technology and Expectations in the 
Automobile Age, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. 
MOSKOWITZ Sanford L. (2016), Advanced Materials Innovation: Managing 
Global Technology in the 20th Century, Hoboken, John Wiley & Sons. 
MOWERY David C., NELSON Richard R., SAMPAT Bhaven N. & ZIEDONIS 
Arvids A., Ivory Tower and Industrial Innovation: University-Industry Technology 
Transfer before and after the Bayh-Dole Act, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press. 
NOVEMBER Joseph A. (2012), Biomedical Computing: Digitizing Life in the 
United States, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. 
O’BRIEN S. C., LIU Y., ZHANG Q., HEATH J. R., TITTEL F. K., CURL R. F. 
& SMALLEY R. E. (1986), “Supersonic Cluster Beams of III-V 
Semiconductors: GaxAsy”, Journal of Chemical Physics, vol. 84, p. 4074-
4079. 
PLOTNICK Rachel (2012), “At the Interface: The Case of the Electric Push 
Button, 1880-1923”, Technology and Culture, vol. 53, n°4, p. 815-840. 
 THE DIVERSE ECOLOGY OF ELECTRONIC MATERIALS  241 
RAYWARD W. Boyd & BOWDEN Mary Ellen (eds.) (2002), The History and 
Heritage of Scientific and Technological Information Systems, Medford, 
Information Today. 
ROBERT W. Keyes (1969), “Physical Problems and Limits in Computer 
Logic”, IEEE Spectrum, vol. 6, May, p. 36-45. 
ROBINSON Arthur L. (1983), “IBM Drops Superconducting Computer 
Project”, Science, vol. 222, n°4623, p. 492-494. 
SLAYTON Rebecca (2013), Arguments That Count: Physics, Computing, and 
Missile Defense, 1949-2012, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press. 
SMALLEY Richard E. (1991, March), “C60, Chapter 2”, talk given at the 
American Physical Society March Meeting, Cincinnati (USA). 
SMITH Douglas K.  & ALEXANDER Robert C. (1988), Fumbling the Future: 
How Xerox Invented, then Ignored, the First Personal Computer, New York, 
William Morrow and Co. 
SPARROW Robert (2007), “Revolutionary and Familiar, Inevitable and 
Precarious: Rhetorical Contradictions in Enthusiasm for Nano-
technology”, NanoEthics, vol. 1, p. 57-68. 
TINN Hong-hong (2012), Working with computers, constructing a developing 
country: Introducing, using, building, and tinkering with computers in Cold War 
Taiwan, 1959-1984, Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University (Ithaca). 
WRIGHT Aaron Sidney (2016), “The Physics of Forgetting: 
Thermodynamics of Information at IBM 1959-1982”, Perspectives on 
Science, vol. 24, n°1, p. 112-141. 
ZEITLIN Jonathan (2007), “The Historical Alternatives Approach”, in 
Geoffrey JONES & Jonathan ZEITLIN (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Business 
History, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 120-140. 
 
